Ashford University Explanation of The Basic Human Desire the desire to Be Questions

Ashford University Explanation of The Basic Human Desire the desire to Be Questions Ashford University Explanation of The Basic Human Desire the desire to Be Questions ORDER NOW FOR CUSTOMIZED AND ORIGINAL NURSING PAPERS Unformatted Attachment Preview Existentialism in the 209th Century 2nd Paper: Due Sunday Night, Nov 1st Sartre Your paper should total about three pages (each page/prompt 300 words for a total of about 900 or so). Please stay within the assigned limits. Submit on Harvey as with the first paper. Preliminary: Post-War French existential humanism is based on a thorough-going renunciation of “transcendence” in any traditional sense. It allows for no appeal to metaphysical, religious, or ideological divinities or being beyond the circle of human experience and existence. It acknowledges a human condition or a human reality but not a “human nature” in the traditional sense that would assign to the individual intrinsic goals and aims in advance of all freedom or choice (e.g, divine commands or natural ends). For man, “existence precedes essence.” Man’s freedom is not pre-determined by anything except that imperative to decide. Even the values and ideals he chooses by are established for him by his own decision. All meaning is confined within mortal human bounds, even that which seems to reach beyond. All traditional philosophies of transcendence must be abandoned, for the good of human life itself. Albert Camus lays down the baseline of this abandonment of any attempt to “redeem” human existence by appeal to something outside and above it (whether God, a teleological order of nature, or an ideological substitute for God, such as “Man in History” (à la Marx, Hegel, or Comte). Camus believes a simple return to nature, humanity, and life is enough to close this circle. The circular path of Sisyphus up and down his hill with his rock, his daily circuit, expresses his humane and reflective hedonism as a model of life. Jean-Paul Sartre, however, does not abandon the notion of “transcendence”—though he fully concurs with Camus on the atheistic rejection of any reference to what transcends man or world. Far from rejecting transcendence, he seems to identify it as the heart of the human condition—its freedom, its vital awareness, even its nothingness, its quasi-Platonic “lack of being” that aims at being as the meaning of human activity. Instead of denying the significance of the idea of God, Sartre thus claims that man is the “desire to be God” and that this desire is precisely what makes him “human” and establishes a human “community”—a human race rather than just a biological human species, if one may put it that way.Ashford University Explanation of The Basic Human Desire the desire to Be Questions While pre-WWII humanists such as Karl Marx, his mentor Ludwig Feuerbach, or August Comte posit “Man” as God and History as the realization of the “divinity of man” or a “religion of Humanity,” Sartre envisions no such divinity in man or teleology in history. Rather, man is constituted by a desire to be God—the meaning revealed in all of his actions—but not that he actually is a God or ever could be. Quite the contrary, for him this desire is inherently doomed to failure and defeat (and so immune to historical “progress” envisioned by those other thinkers). Man is, as it were, an aborted, so-called God. It would seem that Sartre sees in the modern world of bourgeois equality (the democratic world unfolding after the French Revolution) not so much a realization of the divinity of man à la Marx et al. as the emergence of a social order denuded of all divinity and thus showing men and women for what they really are—creatures doomed by the “freedom” afforded by consciousness to pursue a being ultimately beyond their reach but unshakeable all the same. (It is not an accident that the most truthful character in No Exit is the cruel cynic Inez.) This is a world in which human beings seek to realize themselves as God(s) in the presence of each other—and so always abortively. Instead of the divinity of man, the modern world is one where “hell is other people”—a world in which the being an individual pursues is always a “secret” held by others, as if it had been stolen from them. It is as if he is turning the Marxian-Comtean utopias upside down. He is showing these utopias to be a product of this desire—in the form of bad faith. The core Sartrean insight, in his account of being-for-others, is that the individual encounters his being only when it has been put into question—by others, who have robbed him of it. Given his nothingness, the being of his being as consciousness of being, Man’s being is always put into question by the being of others. Sartre thinks the traditional forms of transcendence (including ideology) are actually forms of “bad faith,” strategic procedures and ploys by which human beings seek to maintain themselves in a “metastable” avoidance of the truth about themselves in relation to each other. They project something beyond the human which holds them in reserve, so to say, free of the contaminations and humiliations of being-for-others. Ashford University Explanation of The Basic Human Desire the desire to Be Questions Even in a world denuded of traditional transcendence, though, individuals still practice bad faith in their relations to each other and themselves. In the absence of God, they themselves pretend to be God—beyond the reach of the judgment of others, outside this world and even their own factical, embodied existence in it. Of course, this type of strategy can also be reversed, and instead of holding themselves aloof from the world they can plunge into bodily existence, and seek to square the circle that way, as in Sartre’s analysis of sexual desire. With this Sartrean matrix in mind, answer the following three questions. Please identify them by number in you answer. Ashford University Explanation of The Basic Human Desire the desire to Be QuestionsAnswer each of these three questions in any order you choose: 1. How does Sartre explain the basic human desire, the “desire to be,” from his core analysis of the human condition (the For-Itself, the In-itself, consciousness, nothingness, etc.). 2. Why does Sartre believe that human relations (“concrete relations with others” such as love, desire, hate, masochism, sadism, also the Look, etc.) are essentially geared to conflict? And how does that relate to the fundamental human desire? 3. What does this mean in terms of the possibility of a Sartrean ethics or politics? Is a positive ethic entailed by or compatible with this “ontological” description of the human condition? (Is there some ideal of “authenticity” that avoids bad faith?) What about politics? (This question requires some judgment and discernment on your part—I am open to creative suggestions, but [needless to say] they must be well-articulated and grounded in an understanding of the Sartrean issues.) Bon chance! Existentialism in the 209th Century 2nd Paper: Due Sunday Night, Nov 1st Sartre Your paper should total about three pages (each page/prompt 300 words for a total of about 900 or so). Please stay within the assigned limits. Submit on Harvey as with the first paper. Preliminary: Post-War French existential humanism is based on a thorough-going renunciation of “transcendence” in any traditional sense. It allows for no appeal to metaphysical, religious, or ideological divinities or being beyond the circle of human experience and existence. It acknowledges a human condition or a human reality but not a “human nature” in the traditional sense that would assign to the individual intrinsic goals and aims in advance of all freedom or choice (e.g, divine commands or natural ends). For man, “existence precedes essence.” Man’s freedom is not pre-determined by anything except that imperative to decide. Even the values and ideals he chooses by are established for him by his own decision. All meaning is confined within mortal human bounds, even that which seems to reach beyond. All traditional philosophies of transcendence must be abandoned, for the good of human life itself. Albert Camus lays down the baseline of this abandonment of any attempt to “redeem” human existence by appeal to something outside and above it (whether God, a teleological order of nature, or an ideological substitute for God, such as “Man in History” (à la Marx, Hegel, or Comte). Camus believes a simple return to nature, humanity, and life is enough to close this circle. The circular path of Sisyphus up and down his hill with his rock, his daily circuit, expresses his humane and reflective hedonism as a model of life. Jean-Paul Sartre, however, does not abandon the notion of “transcendence”—though he fully concurs with Camus on the atheistic rejection of any reference to what transcends man or world. Far from rejecting transcendence, he seems to identify it as the heart of the human condition—its freedom, its vital awareness, even its nothingness, its quasi-Platonic “lack of being” that aims at being as the meaning of human activity. Instead of denying the significance of the idea of God, Sartre thus claims that man is the “desire to be God” and that this desire is precisely what makes him “human” and establishes a human “community”—a human race rather than just a biological human species, if one may put it that way. While pre-WWII humanists such as Karl Marx, his mentor Ludwig Feuerbach, or August Comte posit “Man” as God and History as the realization of the “divinity of man” or a “religion of Humanity,” Sartre envisions no such divinity in man or teleology in history. Rather, man is constituted by a desire to be God—the meaning revealed in all of his actions—but not that he actually is a God or ever could be. Quite the contrary, for him this desire is inherently doomed to failure and defeat (and so immune to historical “progress” envisioned by those other thinkers). Man is, as it were, an aborted, so-called God. It would seem that Sartre sees in the modern world of bourgeois equality (the democratic world unfolding after the French Revolution) not so much a realization of the divinity of man à la Marx et al. as the emergence of a social order denuded of all divinity and thus showing men and women for what they really are—creatures doomed by the “freedom” afforded by consciousness to pursue a being ultimately beyond their reach but unshakeable all the same. (It is not an accident that the most truthful character in No Exit is the cruel cynic Inez.) This is a world in which human beings seek to realize themselves as God(s) in the presence of each other—and so always abortively. Instead of the divinity of man, the modern world is one where “hell is other people”—a world in which the being an individual pursues is always a “secret” held by others, as if it had been stolen from them. It is as if he is turning the Marxian-Comtean utopias upside down. He is showing these utopias to be a product of this desire—in the form of bad faith. The core Sartrean insight, in his account of being-for-others, is that the individual encounters his being only when it has been put into question—by others, who have robbed him of it. Given his nothingness, the being of his being as consciousness of being, Man’s being is always put into question by the being of others. Sartre thinks the traditional forms of transcendence (including ideology) are actually forms of “bad faith,” strategic procedures and ploys by which human beings seek to maintain themselves in a “metastable” avoidance of the truth about themselves in relation to each other. They project something beyond the human which holds them in reserve, so to say, free of the contaminations and humiliations of being-for-others. Even in a world denuded of traditional transcendence, though, individuals still practice bad faith in their relations to each other and themselves. In the absence of God, they themselves pretend to be God—beyond the reach of the judgment of others, outside this world and even their own factical, embodied existence in it. Of course, this type of strategy can also be reversed, and instead of holding themselves aloof from the world they can plunge into bodily existence, and seek to square the circle that way, as in Sartre’s analysis of sexual desire. With this Sartrean matrix in mind, answer the following three questions. Please identify them by number in you answer. Answer each of these three questions in any order you choose: 1. How does Sartre explain the basic human desire, the “desire to be,” from his core analysis of the human condition (the For-Itself, the In-itself, consciousness, nothingness, etc.). 2. Why does Sartre believe that human relations (“concrete relations with others” such as love, desire, hate, masochism, sadism, also the Look, etc.) are essentially geared to conflict? And how does that relate to the fundamental human desire? 3. What does this mean in terms of the possibility of a Sartrean ethics or politics? Is a positive ethic entailed by or compatible with this “ontological” description of the human condition? (Is there some ideal of “authenticity” that avoids bad faith?) What about politics? (This question requires some judgment and discernment on your part—I am open to creative suggestions, but [needless to say] they must be well-articulated and grounded in an understanding of the Sartrean issues.) Bon chance! Existentialism in the 209th Century 2nd Paper: Due Sunday Night, Nov 1st Sartre Your paper should total about three pages (each page/prompt 300 words for a total of about 900 or so). Ashford University Explanation of The Basic Human Desire the desire to Be Questions Please stay within the assigned limits. Submit on Harvey as with the first paper. Preliminary: Post-War French existential humanism is based on a thorough-going renunciation of “transcendence” in any traditional sense. It allows for no appeal to metaphysical, religious, or ideological divinities or being beyond the circle of human experience and existence. It acknowledges a human condition or a human reality but not a “human nature” in the traditional sense that would assign to the individual intrinsic goals and aims in advance of all freedom or choice (e.g, divine commands or natural ends). For man, “existence precedes essence.” Man’s freedom is not pre-determined by anything except that imperative to decide. Even the values and ideals he chooses by are established for him by his own decision. All meaning is confined within mortal human bounds, even that which seems to reach beyond. All traditional philosophies of transcendence must be abandoned, for the good of human life itself. Albert Camus lays down the baseline of this abandonment of any attempt to “redeem” human existence by appeal to something outside and above it (whether God, a teleological order of nature, or an ideological substitute for God, such as “Man in History” (à la Marx, Hegel, or Comte). Camus believes a simple return to nature, humanity, and life is enough to close this circle. The circular path of Sisyphus up and down his hill with his rock, his daily circuit, expresses his humane and reflective hedonism as a model of life. Jean-Paul Sartre, however, does not abandon the notion of “transcendence”—though he fully concurs with Camus on the atheistic rejection of any reference to what transcends man or world. Far from rejecting transcendence, he seems to identify it as the heart of the human condition—its freedom, its vital awareness, even its nothingness, its quasi-Platonic “lack of being” that aims at being as the meaning of human activity. Instead of denying the significance of the idea of God, Sartre thus claims that man is the “desire to be God” and that this desire is precisely what makes him “human” and establishes a human “community”—a human race rather than just a biological human species, if one may put it that way. While pre-WWII humanists such as Karl Marx, his mentor Ludwig Feuerbach, or August Comte posit “Man” as God and History as the realization of the “divinity of man” or a “religion of Humanity,” Sartre envisions no such divinity in man or teleology in history. Rather, man is constituted by a desire to be God—the meaning revealed in all of his actions—but not that he actually is a God or ever could be. Quite the contrary, for him this desire is inherently doomed to failure and defeat (and so immune to historical “progress” envisioned by those other thinkers). Man is, as it were, an aborted, so-called God. It would seem that Sartre sees in the modern world of bourgeois equality (the democratic world unfolding after the French Revolution) not so much a realization of the divinity of man à la Marx et al. as the emergence of a social order denuded of all divinity and thus showing men and women for what they really are—creatures doomed by the “freedom” afforded by consciousness to pursue a being ultimately beyond their reach but unshakeable all the same. (It is not an accident that the most truthful character in No Exit is the cruel cynic Inez.) This is a world in which human beings seek to realize themselves as God(s) in the presence of each other—and so always abortively. Instead of the divinity of man, the modern world is one where “hell is other people”—a world in which the being an individual pursues is always a “secret” held by others, as if it had been stolen from them. It is as if he is turning the Marxian-Comtean utopias upside down. He is showing these utopias to be a product of this desire—in the form of bad faith. The core Sartrean insight, in his account of being-for-others, is that the individual encounters his being only when it has been put into question—by others, who have robbed him of it. Given his nothingness, the being of his being as consciousness of being, Man’s being is always put into question by the being of others. Sartre thinks the traditional forms of transcendence (including ideology) are actually forms of “bad faith,” strategic procedures and ploys by which human beings seek to maintain themselves in a “metastable” avoidance of the truth about themselves in relation to each other. They project something beyond the human which holds them in reserve, so to say, free of the contaminations and humiliations of being-for-others. Even in a world denuded of traditional transcendence, though, individuals still practice bad faith in their relations to each other and themselves. In the absence of God, they themselves pretend to be God—beyond the reach of the judgment of others, outside this world and even their own factical, embodied existence in it. Of course, this type of strategy can also be reversed, and instead of holding themselves aloof from the world they can plunge into bodily existence, and seek to square the circle that way, as in Sartre’s analysis of sexual desire. With this Sartrean matrix in mind, answer the following three questions. Please identify them by number in you answer. Answer each of these three questions in any order you choose: 1. How does Sartre explain the basic human desire, the “desire to be,” from his core analysis of the human condition (the For-Itself, the In-itself, consciousness, nothingness, etc.). 2. Why does Sartre believe that human relations (“concrete relations with others” such as love, desire, hate, masochism, sadism, also the Look, etc.) are essentially geared to conflict? And how does that relate to the fundamental human desire? 3. What does this mean in terms of the possibility of a Sartrean ethics or politics? Is a positive ethic entailed by or compatible with this “ontological” description of the human condition? (Is there some ideal of “authenticity” that avoids bad faith?) What about politics? (This question requires some judgment and discernment on your part—I am open to creative suggestions, but [needless to say] they must be well-articulated and grounded in an understanding of the Sartrean issues.) 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